The adoption of the European Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) represented a crucial improvement 10 in the management of watercourses and coastlines. However, the beginning of a new phase of 11 implementation requires the assessment of which emerging topics may be included in the review 12 process. The aim of our research is to understand the existence of any legislative gaps that could 13 limit the preparedness to cascading events and critical infrastructures breakdowns. First, we provide 14 a review of the Floods Directive, the cascading phenomena and the vulnerability of critical 15 infrastructures in the European legislation. Secondly, we analyse some case-studies to test the 16 present approach and to improve the work of decision makers. Our results suggest that the Floods 17 Directive tends to focus on localized flood impacts at smaller time scale and it could be ineffective 18 to address the cross-scale impact of cascading events. Although some of the corrective actions may 19 not be of competence of the Directive, we argue that their inclusion could limit uncertainties in the 20 attribution of responsibilities and the coordination among different institutional levels. 21 22
Introduction 27
It is now evident that human activities contributed to the alterations of climate and precipitations, 28 (Table 1) . This approach has been integrated in the Flood Risk 137
Management Plans in accordance with Articles 4, 5 and 13(1) of the FD, but many differences exist 138 in its implementation among Member States. On the one hand, in many cases it was not feasible to 139 report all the possible consequences of flooding. On the other hand, some countries reported on the 140
Flood Risk Maps information that may increase the flood damage (Excimap 2007a , Nones 2015 , 141 such as storage of chemicals, vital networks and services (e.g., transportation, healthcare, water 142 supply), impact of sediments. 143 144 which implied a scarce availability of data. We had to refer mostly to case studies analysed in our 212 projects, individual researches or evidences approached during some collateral scenarios building. 213
In other words, more than providing an exhaustive comparison with well-structures evidences, our 214 goal is to provide a basis for new studies. In line with the methodological approach suggested by 215 King et al. (1994) , we adopted ex-ante some criteria to allow homogeneity of selection and future 216 replicability: 217
11
-cases had to be distinguished by cascading patterns, in line with the definition given by Pescaroli 218 and Alexander (2015). In particular, the presence of non-linear escalation dynamics had to be 219 evident in socio-ecological systems; 220 -cases had to provide a comprehensive view on natural and built environments, and social 221 vulnerabilities. They had to show the presence of anthropic vulnerabilities, which are only partially 222 addressed by the current form of the FD; 223 -cases had to be related to surface water environments, in particular rivers, which is the application 224 field of the FD analysed in the present paper. 225 However, the evidence can be also counter-intuitive. Gill and Malamud (2014) recorded the 258 interactions-relationships between over twenty natural hazards, drawn from six risk groups: 259 geophysical, hydrological, shallow earth, atmospheric, biophysical and space hazards. They 260 suggested that floods are very likely to be generated by primary triggers such as adverse 261 meteorological conditions or earthquakes, more than be just the cause of cascading. This approach 262 can be integrated with climate change scenarios to understand the long-term sensibility of areas to 263 combined risk, but also with better vulnerability assessments strategies that could address the roots 264 of secondary events, when they lie in anthropic causes (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015) . 265
The following case studies will explain better this approach, focusing on social and economical 266 systems. 267 supply; iii) cascading requires the acceptance of possible reasonable worst case scenarios, which 391 probability sometimes is simply underestimated by policy makers or public and private managers. 392
In first instance, the FD should include a higher balance between hazard and vulnerability 393 management to provide some better advice to water managers. This problem was already reflected 394 in a scarce tendency to implement non structural mitigation measures (Klijn et al. 2008 
